\*\*翻译策略声明\*\*

"realism"一律处理为“实在论”；虽然，文学的“realism”按百年以来汉文对西文翻译实践的约定，已经固定为“现实主义”。

总的说来，我的立场是反对市面上流行的许多二十世纪哲学（以及，更广义的，人文学科、社会科学著作的翻译策略的），我主张不涉及核心论证的部分应该接近现代汉语口语（实际上，许多原文的非核心部分，就是使用英语的（准）口语的，许多被回溯地标准化为术语的词汇，起源相当市井，而非象牙塔）。

In his most famous work, Thomas Kuhn argued that when a dominant paradigm begins to collapse, scientists begin consulting philosophy, a subject toward which they are normally disdainful.

托马斯-库恩在他最有名的著作里就论证过，一个统治性的范式要崩溃的时候，科学家们就开始咨诹哲学这么一个他们自己一般（\*\*normal在这里其实是指库恩意义下的有别于范式转换阶段的“常规科学的实践”\*\*）会嫌弃的主题了。

It seems that only when they are faced with accumulating anomalies and a deepening sense of crisis do scientists begin to take seriously the work of their more humanistic colleagues.

好像说，只有面对越积越多的反常（\*\*一个库恩式主题当中的关键词\*\*），以及愈演愈烈的危机感的时候，科学家才会开始严肃地打量比他们更有人文性的同事的工作。

But Kuhn’s observation could just as easily be reversed, since when humanistic disciplines are in a state of paradigm collapse, they often invoke the natural sciences.

但是要逆转库恩的观察也容易，毕竟人文学科要范式崩溃的时候，他们也是常常传唤自然科学的。

Necessarily, there are good ways to use scientific findings in humanistic research.

必然，很有些好方法，可以在人文性的研究里调用科学的各色发现。

But many gestures toward natural science in philosophy involve superficially misusing scientific terminology or quantitative methods.

不过哲学里对于自然科学的若干姿态里面，也有很多对科学术语或者量化方法的肤浅运用。

Political theory can be spiced up with jargon wrested from pop neuroscience or complexity theory.

政治理论嘛，则就是通俗脑科学或者复杂性科学的黑话的一通缝合。

Continental philosophy can be enlivened with phrases usurped from quantum physics or ecology.

欧陆哲学嘛，则就是只需要从量子物理或者生态学偷师些短语，便可以延寿了。

Literary analysis can be formalized by hastily adopting “big data” and pretending its subjects can be modeled like fluid dynamics, and so on.

文学分析靠匆忙取用点“大数据”就能形式化了，仿佛它的诸主题可以像流体动力学一样建模了。诸如此类。

These are largely rhetorical moves that are compelling at a superficial glance, but further analysis demonstrates that these apparent parallels are lacking in deeper shared substance.

这些大体都是些话术上的操弄，乍一看很有力，但是往深了分析，就显得外表上的相应是在了，更深层的共同内里倒缺了。

Science seems to be useful to humanists mostly when it reinforces positions the humanities already take as givens.

科学，对于人文学者而言，基本上只有在强化被人文学已经当作是所予的东西（\*\*因而不消阐说；“所予”是一个标准的，近世哲学里已经有，而在二十世纪重新主题化了的哲学黑话\*\*）的时候，才好像是派得上用场的。

As bad as superficial gestures to science may be, however, the most fulsome expression of this response to paradigm collapse is espousing allegiance toward “realism” as such, especially when undertheorized.

对于科学的肤浅姿态是可能很烂，不过呢，对于范式崩溃的这一回应的最完满的表达，就在于对这般的“实在论”表忠心、尤其是理论还没到位的时候。

When a discipline’s foundations are disintegrating, claiming to be a “realist” is often an attempt to both keep skeptics at bay and signal a shallow scientism.

一个学科的诸基础要分崩离析的时候，声称要当个“实在论者”经常就是准备一面要拱开怀疑论者，又要声张一种浅薄的科学主义。

Indeed, the gradual breakdown of various guiding research paradigms in the humanities and social sciences has led to several decades of proliferating natural science–inspired “realisms” (e.g., critical realism, speculative realism, and so on).

不错，人文学科以及社会科学里面的各色领导性的研究范式的渐次瓦解，已经导致过自然科学诱发的“复数多的实在论”的勃发（比如说，批判实在论、思辨实在论，之类的）。

Some of these realisms are motivated by a backlash against the slow disintegration of the disciplinary objects—“religion,” “art,” and so on— discussed in chapter 2.

这里面有些实在论，受到策动，乃是出于对第二章讨论的那些个学科性的对象——“宗教”啦、“艺术”啦，等等——的慢慢瓦解的逆反。

To anticipate, with many disciplines becoming increasingly skeptical of the utility of their organizing categories, it should not be a surprise that the main thing some of these newer realists are interested in asserting is the reality of the disciplinary objects themselves.

可以想见，既然有这么多学科都越来越怀疑它们的组织性范畴（\*\*如果你愿意，也可以翻译为“有机化范畴”，暗示那种可以予以诸材料以无法还原为部分的性质因而非机械论的、有涉于整体的、综合的统一性\*\*）的效用，那要说这些更新锐的实在论者，他们主要断言的恰恰就是各种学科性对象的实在性本身，简直就是度内之事。

For instance, from its title, a “realist ontology of religion” might suggest a theological defense of the reality of some particular religious ontological claim, such as the existence of God.

比如说，从标题就可以见得，一个“实在论的宗教的存有学”意味的，就是对一些特定宗教存有学主张的实在性的神学上的回护呗。（\*\*"ontology"翻译为“存有学”，而不是“本体论”，因为一般来说当代学术哲学里对这个词汇的使用相对松散（即，普通的，蒯因式的，“what is there”），使用者是未必要和，在康德-后康德哲学传统尤为显著的，“现象/表象”之类相区分；或是与任何（新）亚里士多德传统的what grounds what的形而上学企划挂钩；当然，这些是赘言。\*\*）

But when we turn toward self-avowed realists in religious studies, “realism” instead seems to announce one’s belief in “a social reality that exists ‘out there’” and a “realist interpretation of the term [religion],” which the author defines in terms of a repackaged nineteenth-century definition of “religion” as “an account that holds that there are forms of life predicated on a belief in the existence of superhuman beings.”

不过我们要回转来看到那些个在宗教学领域自命是实在论者的人的时候，“实在论”倒反而好像是要陈说一个人是有对于一个“就在那般存在的一个社会性实在”，以及，一个“对于[宗教]一词的实在论诠释“的信念的，而这个信念又是用重新打包过的十九世纪的”宗教“定义也就是”主张有以对超人类存在者的存有的信念为前提的生命形式的一种说法（\*\*我的策略是将“account”固定翻译为“说法”\*\*）“

I will address these notions of a world “out there” and “social reality” later, but I want the reader to register that what being a realist about “religion” seems to signify is not that any particular religious ontological claims are real, but that particular scholarly definitions should be protected from postmodern criticism.

我之后将着眼于这些个关于“在那般”的世界、以及“社会性的实在”的想法（\*\*我的策略是将“notion”固定翻译为“想法”，视情况改写为“观念”，这样同"idea","conception"之类相区分\*\*），不过我现在想让读者明了的是，当一个关于“宗教”的实在论者，不是要说，哦，任何一个特定的宗教的存有学主张，是实在的，而是说，特定的学术的定义，将不受后现代批判。

We could approach this in a different way and ask what, beyond their disciplinary subject matter, are realists in the human sciences realists about?

我们可以换一条取径，问，在它们的学科性的主题之外，人文学科里的实在论者，是关于什么的实在论者啊？

Although this is not meant to be exhaustive, many realisms are stand-ins for two contradictory things: a commitment to a “reality” that functions principally as a proxy for a non-specialist’s notion of the current worldview of physics, and an emphasis on “the real” as something mind-independent.

虽然这个回答不能一网打尽，不过很多实在论是要为两个相抵牾的东西站台：一个是，承诺一个首要地作为非专家的当前物理学世界观的方便法门的“实在(the reality)”，一个是，对于某种独立于心灵的“现实（the real）”的推重。（\*\*“proxy”当然可以翻译为“代理者”，但是如你所见，在无涉核心主张、立场、论证细节的地方，我不愿意使用这种拗口翻译\*\*）

These two forms of realism are then often conflated with a defense of the social scientist’s object of inquiry and presented in contrast to supposedly corrosive social constructionism or postmodern antirealism.

这两种实在论的形式就往往与对社会科学家的考察对象的回护相杂糅，而与据说是流毒不浅的社会建构论或者后现代反实在论对垒。

In the first case, many contemporary philosophers have seen the stakes of the debate over realism as being about the status of our current best scientific theories.

第一种情形里面，很多当代哲学家觉得实在论的辩论的要害在于我们的当前最佳科学理论的地位。

These commitments are clearly on display in the new realisms.

这些个承诺在新的各色实在论里面是很清楚地摆出来了的。

Critical realism, for instance, often takes as its inaugural moment Roy Bhaskar’s A Realist Theory of Science and his extension of those insights to social sciences in The Possibility of Naturalism.

就比如，批判实在论往往就是拿罗伊-巴斯卡的《科学的实在论理论》和他在《自然主义的可能性》中对这些见解的延展当作肇始的。

Similarly, allies of speculative realism have argued that “the only credible metaphysic is one that is sensitive to the philosophical implications of the natural sciences” and that “it is science itself that enjoins us to discover the source of its own absoluteness.”

无独有偶，思辨实在论的盟军们有论证过，“唯一能信的形而上学就是对于自然科学的哲学意蕴敏感的形而上学”，以及，“是科学本身命令我们发现其自身绝对性的来源。”

Yet, on a closer reading of their work, most so-called antirealists also grant that the conclusions of contemporary scientific research are approximately accurate.

然而，大多数所谓的反传统主义者，把他们的作品往细里读了之后，也承认当代科学研究的结论是大致精确的。

Moreover, both realists and antirealists accept the relative reality of commonsense objects. So, what do they actually disagree about?

再一个，实在论者和反实在论者都接受常识对象的相对的实在性。那，他们到底是对什么有分歧呢？

It would seem that realist and antirealist philosophers differ primarily in the nature of the strawman attacks they launch at each other.

晃眼一看，实在论和反实在论的哲学家们有异，主要是在于他们相互发动的稻草人攻击的本质相殊。

As Simon Blackburn summarizes: On the one hand it seems absurd . . . to question the reality of the objects of common-sense, or core scientific theory.

西蒙-布莱克本是有所总结的：一面是，质疑常识或核心科学理论的对象的实在性，好像很荒唐...

On the other hand realism is often seen as demanding the mythical God’s eye view, whereby we step out of our own skins, and comment on the extent to which our best scientific theory corresponds with an independent reality. . . .

另一面呢，实在论常常被觉得是，要求通过神话般的上帝之眼目，来越过我们一孔之识见，而指摘我们的最好的科学理论与一个独立的实在的相合程度. . .

In the one view realism seems almost indisputably true, and in another equally obviously false or undiscussable. So there is every opening for debates in which each side talks past each other.

在一种观点中，实在论似乎几乎是无可争议地为真的，而在另一种观点中，同样明显是错误或讨论不了的。因此，在辩论中，每一方都有机会说过对方。

Hence, although it is controversial, many philosophers have argued that the whole debate over realism is “dead” or basically a non-issue. This is not the whole story, however, and I will discuss debates about “independent reality” further below. But it does seem that the realist vs. antirealist argument is largely a false opposition, and many (but clearly not all) scholars in the humanities and social sciences who declare themselves to be realists without specifying or really understanding current scientific models are basically just signaling their scientism. (Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, literary realism has historically been in a feedback relationship to scientism—as literary accounts of what is real both reflect contemporary notions of science and produce new understandings of science.)

这样的话，虽然有争议，但许多哲学家认为，关于实在论的整个辩论已经 "死了"，或者基本上是不关要事的。但，到这还没完，我将在下面进一步讨论关于 "独立的实在 "的辩论。但确实，实在论对决反实在论的论证，似乎在很大程度上是一种错误的对立，许多（但显然不是全部）人文和社会科学的学者，在没有具体给出或真正理解当前的科学模型的情况下，自命是实在论者，基本上只算是在声明他们的科学主义立场而已。（此外，正如我在其他地方所论证的，文学里的实在论在历史上与科学主义处于一种反馈关系，因为，文学里关于什么是实在的的说法既反映同时代科学的既有想法，也产生对科学的新的理解。）